Income Smoothing Via Loan Loss Provisions and IFRS Implication: Evidence from Ethiopian Banks by Mune, Tesfamlak Mulatu
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/EJBM 
Vol.11, No.16, 2019 
 
40 
Income Smoothing Via Loan Loss Provisions and IFRS 
Implication: Evidence from Ethiopian Banks 
 
Tesfamlak Mulatu Mune* 
Department of Accounting and Finance, Injibara University, PO box 40, Injibara, Ethiopia 
 
Abiy Getahun Kolech 
Department of Accounting and Finance, Jimma University, PO box 378, Jimma, Ethiopia 
 
 (Self-Sponsored information) 
Abstract 
text Using a single stage regression that models the non-discretionary part of loan loss provisions, we establish 
whether Ethiopian banks use loan loss provisions to smooth their income in a country with no foreign banks and 
high dominance of state ownership. Existing literature suggests that banks use loan loss provisions as a tool for 
income smoothing. Results support bank income smoothing via loan loss provisions and need of external fund 
have significant positive influence on loan loss provisioning towards income smoothing practice of Ethiopian 
banks in anticipation to attract external funds. 
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1. Introduction 
Banking industry is one of the most profitable industries in Ethiopia and witnessed unprecedented growth in terms 
of deposit mobilization and disbursement of credit. Generally, banks’ largest assets are loan and advances where 
lending is the main activity to generate income, thus, they are considered as a risky business (Foos, et al. (2010)). 
Credit risk is the potential financial loss resulting from the failure of the borrower or counterparty to meet its 
obligation in accordance with agreed terms (Watanabe (2007)). Credit risk in banks play a central role as it could 
endanger bank solvency and stability, thus have substantial economic significance (Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas 
(1999)). Therefore, to absorb any losses arising from loan default banks make a reserve for the future loan losses 
using loan loss provisions (LLP) (Hasan and Wall (2004), Wahlen (1994)). Loan loss provisions (LLP) can be 
defined as estimation for probable loan losses for the current year and this amount will be charged on the income 
statement as expense (non-cash) on a yearly basis (Walter (1991), Wahlen (1994)).  
Loan loss provisions (LLP) are relatively large accrual of banks, set for the purpose adjusting banks’ loan 
loss reserves to reflect expected future losses on their loan portfolios (Abdu, Shah, & Mohd (2015)). Hence, in 
theory, the accrual of loan loss provisions (LLP) in the income statement of banks should be solely reflect credit 
risk. However, in practice, LLP is in many countries left to the judgment of banks’ managers and as a result, they 
are one of the important items of the income statement subject to discretionary managerial decisions (Daniel, et al. 
(2006)). In this regard, by referring past theoretical and empirical evidence, Wall and Koch (2000) argue that banks 
have incentives for using their discretion in establishing LLP to manage reported earnings and capital.  Yet, prior 
studies whether bank managers use their discretion over LLP to smooth earnings are not unanimous. 
Earlier studies by Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) and Ma (1988) indicate that bank managers use their 
discretion over LLP to smooth their reported earnings. Lately, also there are several supportive literatures which 
evidences the existence of a positive relation between LLP and earnings (before taxes and LLP) which is consistent 
with smoothing earnings via LLP (Bhat (1996), Collins, et al. (1995)). The same result has been revealed in recent 
studies (Dolar (2016), Leventis, et al. (2011), Onalo, et al. (2014)).  However, there are studies with no evidence 
regarding to banks income smoothing using LLP (Ahmed, et al. (1999), Beatty, et al. (1995)).  
Aforementioned and other studies have been conducted to assess the manipulation LLP to smooth bank 
earnings in different countries. Since the topic gained attention when the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in US asked the loan loss accounting of SunTrust Banks, Inc. in the autumn of 1998, most of the research 
has been carried out on US bank sample. Relatively less numbers of studies have been carried out on data from 
other countries. This study makes an attempt to bridge this gap and tries to study the Ethiopian banks data with 
reference to income smoothing via LLP. 
It is worth noting that the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) had 
important implications regarding the use of LLP for income smoothing. Leventis, et al. (2011) show empirically 
that income smoothing through LLP was substantially reduced after IFRS implementation in the European sample, 
thus improving the quality of banks’ financial reports. Based on this premises, little study was done that empirically 
investigate IFRS effect on Ethiopian banks income smoothing practice. Though, it is stated that banking sector in 
Ethiopia has started using IFRS voluntarily since 2003 (Alemi and Pasricha (2016)). 
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This study therefore motivated because of the limited studies referring to Ethiopian banks in the area of 
income smoothing via LLP and IFRS implication. Moreover, the distinctive setting of banks in Ethiopia such as 
restriction of foreign ownership and high dominance of state owned banks may limit the possibility of inferring 
existing studies to Ethiopian banks. Hence, it is imperative to clarify whether bank managers manipulate LLP in 
order to smooth reported earnings and IFRS implication in the context of Ethiopian banks. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
Loan loss provisions (LLP) can have significant effects on the reported earnings, as they are a large accrual for 
banks. The main aim of manipulating this provision is to smooth income, as reducing earnings variability means 
reducing perceived risk, because variability in earnings is a key indicator of risk (Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas 
(1999), Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1995), Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen (1995)). In other words, 
higher earnings variability means higher perceived risk and required risk premiums, which provides an incentive 
for bank managers to smooth income through loan loss provisions.  
Empirical evidence from previous studies indicates that banks generally use loan loss provisions (LLP) to 
smooth earnings (Anandarajan, Hasan, and McCarthy (2007), Daniel, Vicente, and Jesús (2006), Greenawalt and 
Sinkey (1988)). Bank managers deliberately understated loan loss provisions to mitigate the adverse effect of other 
factors on earnings in the case of poor performance and overstated in the case of good performance in order to 
reduce the variability of earnings. Therefore, the existence of income smoothing through loan loss provisions is 
illustrated by a positive relationship between earnings (before taxes and loan loss provisions) and loan loss 
provisions. Thus, we hypothesize as: 
H1: Loan loss provisions positively associated with earnings (before tax and loan loss provisions). 
When more information on loan loss accounting and limited opportunistic discretion exist, it is expected that the 
incentives for discretionary use of loan loss provisions for income smoothing will be reduced (Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005), Daniel, Vicente, and Jesús (2006)). Principles-based standards called IFRS which require 
extensive disclosure, remove alternative accounting treatments and encourage more rigorous enforcement  came 
to effect since 2005 (IASB (2016)). Based on this premises, no study was done that empirically investigate IFRS 
effect on Ethiopian banks income smoothing practice. Though, it is stated that banking sector in Ethiopia has 
started using IFRS voluntarily since 2003 (Alemi and Pasricha (2016)). Consistent with the objective of IASB, the 
finding by Leventis, et al. (2011) prevails the implementation of IFRS significantly reduced income smoothing 
activity of banks through loan loss provisions (LLP) in Europe. From this, we hypothesize as; 
H2: The relation between loan loss provisions and earnings (before tax and loan loss provision) will be negative 
for banks in the periods where IFRS is used to prepare financial reports relative to the non-IFRS using banks and 
periods. 
The debt to equity ratio is often used to measure a company’s degree of financial leverage (Meaza (2014)). 
The higher the degree of financial leverage, the more vulnerable a company is to volatile earnings reports and 
downturns in the economy due to the obligation to service the debt and incur interest expense (Hilliard (2013). 
Thus, the propensity to smooth earnings is high when debt to equity ratio tend to be high meaning income 
smoothing and  debt to equity ratio are positively related. Since, the existence of income smoothing through loan 
loss provisions is illustrated by a positive relationship between loan loss provisions and earnings (before taxes and 
loan loss provisions). So, the hypothesis in this regard is as follows: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between Debt to Equity ratio and the loan loss provision. 
According to Zoubi and Al-Khazali (2007) and Fernando and Ekanayake (2015) bank managers’ incentive to 
smooth income via loan loss provisions linked with their need of external fund. In order to attract external funds, 
the perceived risk will be adjusted by the loan loss provisions. The external fund need usually reflected by loan to 
deposit ratio, the higher the ratio, the more the need of external funds. A positive relationship between loan loss 
provisions and loans to deposit ratio will be expected because to attract external funds a bank must reduce the 
fluctuations of the earnings by increasing loan loss provisions if the earnings are high and decreasing loan loss 
provisions if the earnings are low. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between loans to deposit ratio and the loan loss provision. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
This study utilizes a balanced panel data set considering nine banks for the period 2005 to 2014. In this study from 
total of 19 banks in Ethiopia, we select nine banks as the sample on the basis of some criteria, literature widely 
use homogenous data in analyzing banking industry in the form of commercial banks only, hence exclude 
government development banks from the sample to report more meaningful results (Leventis, Dimitropoulos, and 
Anandarajan (2011)). Accordingly, the banks in the sample are solely commercial banks that consists state and 
private banks.  In addition, to be included in the sample the bank should have at least 10 years data ranging from 
2005 up to 2014. The sample constitutes banks using GAAP (non-IFRS) or IFRS to prepare their financial 
statements during entire study period and banks that have switched from using non-IFRS to IFRS. The banks 
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financial information and macroeconomic data, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), are gathered from the 
National Bank of Ethiopian (NBE). The period of analysis is restricted to this period due to the availability of 
consistent information. 
Following previous studies like Ahmed, et al. (1999), we employ loan loss provisions () as a dependent 
variable to test income smoothing practice. Though, usually accruals are disentangled into accruals over which 
management has discretion (which can be used to smooth earnings) and accruals over which management does 
not have discretion. Therefore often a two-stage analysis is chosen when researching income smoothing through 
the use of loan loss provisions, which separates the discretionary part of the accrual from the non-discretionary 
part in the first stage. In the first stage the non-discretionary part of loan loss provisions is modeled and the residual 
from this stage, which represents the discretionary part, is used in the second stage as the dependent variable.  
However, this approach has a big disadvantage, namely that it systematically underestimates the absolute 
value of the regression coefficients in the second stage (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Yang (2005)). To counter this, 
following Kanagaretnam, et al. (2005) in this study we use a single-stage regression analysis. Additionally, to 
increase the reliability of the empirical results, Zenderski (2005) found that the use of one-stage estimations 
showed the same results as two-stage regressions. In single-stage, isolating the discretionary component of the 
loan loss provisions through variable control elements that were considered non-discretionary is common in 
literature. Hence, the study take in three control variables as indicators of the non-discretionary component of the 
provision accounts. 
One control variable is the changes in total loan outstanding of bank  at year t scaled by average total assets 
(	
) which measures default risk. Typically, the higher the loan growth, the higher probability of default 
would be. Therefore, it should have a positive relationship with loan loss provisions. However, as cited by Leventis, 
et al. (2011), the influence of this variable on loan loss provisions depends on the quality of incremental loans 
(Lobo and Yang (2001)).  
Another control variable is ratio of beginning loan loss allowance to average total assets of bank  at year t 
(	 ). Besides controlling for default risk, this non-discretionary variable also captures prior provisions 
because the loan loss allowance account provides a summary of past decision regarding loan loss provisions, loan 
charge-offs, and charge-offs’ recoveries. According to Wahlen (1994), a negative coefficient is expected for 
(	). This is because this year’s loan loss provisions are expected to be lower if in previous periods the 
managers use their discretion to overstate expected loan losses.  
Other essential variable to measure bank risk is total loans divided by total assets of bank at year t 
(	
	). This acts as a proxy for the credit risk of bank’s loan portfolio, although Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) 
emphasized that non-performing loans (NPL) perform better as an indicator of risk. However, the NPL data are 
not consistently available on data collected from NBE. Generally, the provisions amount is determined based on 
loan portfolio quality. The rise in the loan portfolio forces a bank to increase loan loss provisions due to higher 
default risk. Thus, the coefficient we expect is positive. 
The main variable of interest is earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions of bank  at year t scaled by 
average total assets (). According to studies such as Ahmed, et al. (1999) and Leventis, et al. (2011), this 
variable used specifically to measure the evidence of income smoothing. A positive coefficient affirms income 
smoothing, where banks increase loan loss provisions when earnings (before taxes and loan loss provisions) rise. 
To examine the degree of leverage relation with loan loss provisions, we use the total debt to common equity ratio 
( ). Whereas, to test the need of external funds, we employ the loan to deposit ratio of bank  at year 
t,(	). 
To see the effect of IFRS adoption, we use a dummy variable to differentiate between adopters and non-
adopters. In view of this,   denotes a dummy variable, equal to one for IFRS adopters’ post-IFRS periods 
and zero for non-adopters and the pre-IFRS time of adopters. The interaction term of  ×   also 
observes differences in income smoothing activities for banks and periods where IFRS used to prepare financial 
reports relative to non-IFRS using banks and periods. Similar to Daniel, et al. (2006) the study incorporate the 
natural logarithm of total assets of bank i year t (
	) to control for bank size. To control business cycle, we 
use real GDP per capita growth rate (GDP).  
Based on the above explanation, we develop a regression model in order to test whether Ethiopian banks use 
loan loss provisions (LLP) to smooth earnings and the level of IFRS relevance. For this reason, following Leventis, 
et al. (2011), we adapt a modified version of the model used by Ahmed, et al. (1999). 
 =  +  +  +  	 + !	
 + "	 + #	
	 + $ + % × 
+ &
	 + 'GDP + ( 
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Table 3.1: Description of variables 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
  Loan loss provisions scaled by average total assets  N/A 
 Earnings before taxes and LLP scaled by average total assets  + 
  Total debts to total common equity ratio + 
	  Total loans and advances divided to total deposits  + 
	
  Changes in total loans and advances scaled by average total assets + 
	  Beginning loan loss allowance scaled by average total assets - 
	
	  Total loans and advances divided by total assets + 
  Dummy variable equal to 1 for IFRS using periods of IFRS 
implemented banks and year, 0 otherwise 
N/A 

×   
Interaction term to capture the evidence of IFRS effect - 

	  Natural logarithm of total assets  + 
GDP Real GDP per capita growth rate - 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Table 4.1: Fixed-Effect Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) 
Independent Variables  Expt. Sign Coefficient (β) Robust Std. Err. t p>t 
Constant  N/A 0.0108079** 0.0044228 2.44 0.04 
 + 0.236955** 0.0841967 2.81 0.023 
  + 0.0004903 0.0003055 1.6 0.147 
	  + 0.0408955** 0.0161016 2.54 0.035 
	
  + -0.011315 0.0080242 -1.41 0.196 
	  - -0.0008323 0.0021167 -0.39 0.704 
	
	 + -0.0454913 0.0214539 -2.12 0.067 
   -0.0038989 0.0048006 -0.81 0.44 
 ×  - -0.0516631 0.1111327 -0.46 0.654 

	  + -0.0022121*** 0.0005177 -4.27 0.003 
GDP - -0.0004306 0.0003343 -1.29 0.234 
F(10,71) = 6.42                 Prob > F = 0.0000 Adj. R- sq: = .34184712 
N= 90              Banks = 9                          Obs. Year  2005 – 2014 
The parenthesis **, *** denoted for significant variables at 5%, and 1% respectively. 
We perform the Hausman’s specification test to detect which panel regression model should be used in order 
to give a more consistent and efficient result. Since the output demonstrates p-values of 0.0112 which is less than 
the significance level 0.05 we reject ) (random effect model), thus we run fixed effect regression model. In order 
to see if data present any specification problem we test heteroscedasticity, serial autocorrelation and spatial 
autocorrelation. The results indicates that, the data does not have first-order autocorrelation but it has 
heteroscedasticity and spatial autocorrelation problem. 
Table 4.1 reports the Fixed-Effect panel least squares results of our model obtained by regressing loan loss 
provision () on independent variables. To control the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations the 
standard errors of estimators are made to be robust clustered by banks. The model is significant at F (10, 71) = 
6.42, p-value <0.01, indicating that, the entire model is well fitted and good enough in explaining the variation on 
the dependent variable. The value of adjusted R^2 is 0.3418, which indicate that the explanatory variables in this 
study can account for 34.2% of the variation in loan loss provisions. Therefore, the remaining 65.8% of the 
variation in loan loss provisions are caused by other factors that are not included in this model. Because, bank 
managers have incentives to use loan loss provisions to manage earnings and regulatory capital as well as to 
communicate or ‘signal’ private information about future prospects (Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas (1999)). 
However, this study focuses on loan loss provisions as a tool for income smoothing and not as a tool for capital 
management or signaling future oriented information. 
As we observe Table 4.1, the coefficient (β = 0.236955, t =2.81, p < 0.05) for variable of our interest, ratio of 
earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to average total assets ( ) is positive and statistically 
significant. It shows that on average, an increase in earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions by one percent 
influences loan loss provisions (LLP) in positive direction by 23.7%, citrus paribus. This indicates that on average, 
banks in the sample do smooth reported earnings using loan loss provisions over the entire period of analysis. 
Our finding generally consistent with Dolar (2016), Greenawalt and Sinkey Jr (1988), and Rivard, et al. (2003) 
for the US market and Curcio and Hasan (2008) and Duru and Alexandros (2013) for European sample. The result 
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also supports the findings by Zoubi and Al-Khazali (2007) and Daniel, et al. (2006) for the GCC region and Spanish 
banking industry respectively. According to Fonseca and Gonza´lez (2008) who conducted the study on the 
determinants of income smoothing by management of loan loss provisions in banks around the world, a lower 
income smoothing in developed countries than developing countries. Thus, our study result confirms their findings. 
In literature, income smoothing leads to lower accounting transparency and deteriorates financial reporting 
quality of firms (Iatridis (2010)). In the sense that such accounting information seems less effective in facilitating 
the ability of outside investors and regulators to monitor and discipline banks. Therefore, poor financial reporting 
quality and less transparency in Ethiopian banks included in the sample for the study period can be possible 
explanation for our empirical evidence. This is likely due to loopholes of certain rules and regulations of traditional 
bank regulatory practices requiring limited disclosure on loan loss accounting.  
The coefficient for debt to equity ratio () is not statistically significant, thus we have no evidence to 
say debt to equity () has influence on determination of loan loss provisions. This result supports the study 
on determinants of loan loss provisions in Malaysia by Mohd Isa, et al. (2013) who found the debt to equity ratio 
has no significantly determine the loan loss provisions in Malaysia. 
A significant positive coefficient (β= 0.0408955, t =2.54) on loan to deposit ratio(	), indicates that 
when on average an increase in loan to deposit ratio by one percent influences loan loss provisions in positive 
direction by 4.09%, other things remain unchanged. This result implies that bank managers tend smooth earnings 
through loan loss provisions in order to attract external funds. Our findings are consistent with Fernando and 
Ekanayake (2015) whose study show that the extent of income smoothing through loan loss provisions is positively 
related to the ratio of loans to deposits. As the growing industry in Ethiopia, banks effort to capture the market is 
evident by lending most of their deposits to the customers as loans and advances. Pinho (1997) found that provision 
for loan losses would be greatly affected by the banks intention to capture high market share from loans and 
advances. 
Regarding to the non-discretionary component of loan loss provisions (LLP), the coefficients of the variables 
changes in total loans and advances scaled by average total assets (	
), beginning loan loss allowances 
scaled by average total assets (	), and total loans and advances divided by total assets (	
	) are not 
statistically significant.  
The coefficient of dummy variable for implementing periods of IFRS adopted banks during the study period 
() and the interaction variable ( × ) turn out to be not significant. This shows we are not 
in the position to say there is difference in loan loss provisioning and income smoothing for observations with 
IFRS implementation and non-IFRS (GAAP). As a result, our second hypothesis is not supported, contradicting 
to the findings of Leventis, et al. (2011) and Onalo, et al. (2014), that IFRS adoption is associated with lower 
earnings management via loan loss provisions to European banks, and Malaysian and Nigerian banks, respectively. 
According to Ball, et al. (2003), the accounting quality is largely a determinate of firms’ reporting incentives 
created by market forces and institutional factors rather than by accounting standards. In addition, strong 
enforcement mechanisms are associated with lower earnings manipulation and higher disclosure quality (Elerle 
and Schleicher (2013)). Hence, IFRS themselves may not merely mean material changes in income smoothing and 
reporting quality. 
With respect to the control variables, bank size measured by natural logarithm of total assets (
	) seem 
to negatively affect the level of loan loss provisions. This evidences that on average relatively smaller banks 
maintain higher levels of loan loss provisions. According to Leventis, et al. (2011), this may be attributed to less 
efficient strategies to credit risk diversification of small banks and/or presumably large banks might consider that 
their loans are not risky, or alternatively, may be lowering loan loss provisions to inflate earnings. Annual real 
GDP growth (GDP), a   variable controlling macro-economic factors is happened to be insignificant. This result 
suggests that that the macro-economic condition does not explain the way average banks in the sample determine 
their loan loss provisions. 
As already mentioned, Ethiopian banking industry is dominated by state owned bank in terms of size and 
market share. State ownership combined with largeness of those banks, may make more politically visible and 
subject to regulation. Thus, politically visible firms have incentives to report smooth profits by exercising 
discretion over loan loss provisions to avoid the scrutiny of regulators (Chen and Tseng (2012)). In addition, 
Fernando and Ekanayake (2015) suggest that it is important to account for the extent of state ownership of banks. 
Therefore, for sensitivity reason we run fixed effect regression model excluding two state owned banks but there 
is no significant differences from the main result of the study. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We investigate the use of loan loss provisions (LLP) to smooth income by Ethiopian banks using panel data fixed 
effect regression model. The empirical results of this study demonstrates that indeed Ethiopian banks included in 
the sample engage in income smoothing activities via loan loss provisions in the periods studied. The study results 
furthermore suggests bank managers tend smooth earnings in order to attract external funds. It is reasonably 
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possible to state that, this is because of banks effort to capture the unpenetrated market by lending most of their 
deposits to the customers as loans and advances. Income smoothing as common form of earnings management 
would likely to reduce the quality of financial statement information because the data presented might not disclose 
the real condition of the firms (Iatridis (2010)). Therefore, this study encourages the policy makers to rethink the 
loopholes of their policies because earnings can be managed using the loopholes of certain rules and regulations. 
In addition, higher loan loss accounting disclosure requirements by IFRS will lead to lower levels of income 
smoothing. However, IFRS needs strong enforcement mechanisms; therefore, we suggest that the Accounting and 
Auditing Board of Ethiopia (AABE) which is in charge of regulating and guiding the overall financial reporting 
practices of the country should cooperate with National bank of Ethiopia (NBE) which regulate the banking sector 
of Ethiopia to enforce the use of IFRS to improve the accounting quality of banks. Furthermore, shareholders must 
exert appropriate monitoring on managers action and to implement suitable control devices to minimize possible 
agency conflicts. 
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Appendix 
Annex (A) Banks Included in the Sample  
No. Bank Year of Establishment Remark 
1.  Awash International Bank (AIB) 1994 GAAP 
2.  Bank of Abyssinia (BOA) 1996 GAAP 
3.  Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) 1963 IFRS (2003) 
4.  Construction and Business Bank (CBB) 2006 IFRS (2003) 
5.  Cooperative Bank of Oromia (CBO) 2004 IFRS (2013) 
6.  Dashen Bank (DB) 1995 GAAP 
7.  Nib International  Bank (NIB) 1999 GAAP 
8.  United Bank (UB) 1998 IFRS (2005) 
9.  Wegagen Bank (WB) 1997 IFRS (2009) 
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Annex (B) Stata Output for Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Annex (C) Stata Output for Pairwise Correlation 
 
 
Annex (D) Stata Output for Multicollinearty Test of VIF 
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Annex (E) Stata Output for Fixed Effect Estimation  
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Annex (F) Stata output for random effect estimation  
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Annex (G) Stata output for Hausman test 
 
Annex (H) Stata output for Heteroscedasticity test  
  
 
Annex (I)      Stata output for serial correlation test  
 
 
Annex (J)     Stata output for spatial correlation test  
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Annex (K) Stata output for fixed effect estimation (Robust Standard Errors) 
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Annex (L) Stata output for fixed effect estimation (excluding stated owned banks) 
 
 
 
  
